war within a breath

Special Report: The Iraq Commission

07.16.07 - 08:41am

The British state is addicted to unleashing violence, with the inevitable deadly consequences for the powerless, yet no public discussion or debate on Iraq or Afghanistan will face up to that fact

Within the first few minutes of Channel 4 television’s The Iraq Commission: Time to Go, host Jon Snow lamented that car bombs and attacks on the security services were “a daily occurrence” in Iraq. Apparently the bombing, shooting and harassment of the Iraqi people by the occupying forces are not. At least, they were not mentioned.

And this illustrated very quickly the first flaw of this collaboration between Channel 4 television and the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), broadcast on Saturday evening amid much fanfare, with promises that the commission’s report would be dispatched to the offices of the Prime Minister and other political leaders. The murderous disaster in Iraq was something for Britain to wring its hands over but it was not something we had initiated nor something we continued to contribute to.

Co-chairing the commission were representatives of Britain’s three main political parties, Labour’s Baroness Jay, Lord King for the Conservative Party and Lord Ashdown from the Liberal Democrats. They were supported by a panel of analysts including a former head of MI5, a high ranking military man, and a former Labour member of Parliament now at the FPC. The inclusion of an academic, a token Muslim (given little opportunity to express views on Saturday’s programme on any subject except the predictable “radicalisation” of Islam) and the former chief executive of the Refugee Council did little to disguise the second flaw, that this was the British establishment talking to itself.

These people were selected because they already bought into the basic picture of the UK as the benevolent international force, doing its best but beset by the terrible difficulties of trying to bring democracy and justice to the world. Anyone who would really rock the boat, such as a John Pilger, a Mark Curtis or a George Galloway, would not even be in the frame. And there was a damn good reason Margaret Jay was representing the Labour Party and not Tony Benn.

The commission’s view of Iraq was framed at the outset by the selection process. This was the British establishment, and the British establishment continues to accept without question that it has the right to unleash terrible violence on others when it sees fit.

Despite apparently supporting democracy in Iraq (while admitting it may now be impossible, in spite of our best efforts and good intentions obviously) the commission did not seem to have much respect for democracy at home. A specially commissioned poll suggested 30 per cent of the British people wanted troops out of Iraq almost immediately and 47 per cent wanted a withdrawal within 12 to 18 months at the absolute most. The decision would be made by “the people on the ground”, commissioner Sir Paul Lever told Snow, dismissively. So not the British electorate, obviously.

Lord Ashdown said the commission had concluded that the coalition’s original aims were “not achievable”. Well those weapons of mass destruction and active nuclear weapons programme have been proving rather elusive, I thought, but apparently the coalition’s original aim was actually to install a stable liberal democracy in Iraq. Blair must have forgotten to mention it in Parliament, obviously panicked by the fact that Saddam could attack Downing Street within 45 minutes with all those invisible super weapons.

There now needed to be a UN-sponsored diplomatic effort involving regional powers Iran and Syria, Ashdown said, plus a special UN envoy to Iraq. There should also be an international treaty which ensured no permanent presence in Iraq from any outside power. How Paddy thinks he is going to get that one past the White House, with the US building a Vatican-sized embassy in the middle of Baghdad and giant military bases in other areas of the country, was not explained. In fact, rather predictably, the American military’s multi-million dollar building programme in Iraq, just about the only construction going on in the country, was not mentioned. Another example of how the facts were not being allowed to get in the way of the commission’s recommendations. Perhaps it was a cunning tactic to demonstrate that the commission was not a member of that “reality-based community” the Bush administration so despises.

Rosemary Hollis, of think tank Chatham House, told Snow that the coalition had to “engage Iran” and that it should not be trying to exclude Iran from any attempted solution.

A major area the commission investigated was the status of the British troop deployment in Iraq. Tom King, doing his best parrot impression, stressed that “cutting and running” was not an option. However, he did say British forces should cease “offensive operations”. This was highly confusing because I have never heard of us doing anything other than defending people before. Much more of this and the Ministry of Defence might have to be renamed. The primary objective should be to complete the training of the Iraqi forces and draw down as the Iraqis took over responsibility for security, King said. I am sure I have heard something like this suggested before, something about Iraqis standing up and Americans standing down. Perhaps I imagined it.

The advantage of the commission’s plan, King said, was that it was an exit strategy but one under Britain’s control, with no firm timetable. Nevertheless, the commission continued to bleat about the importance of not upsetting the United States government, so it seems it is an exit strategy under Britain’s control only as long as Dubya gives us permission. Yep, that is just the kind of “sovereignty” the White House loves so much.

The commissioners stressed time and again the necessity of retaining Britain’s “special relationship” with the US. The notion that our moral culpability in the Iraq disaster might require us to put the welfare of that nation above keeping on Uncle Sam’s good side on our list of priorities did not enter the discussion.

For all its faults, the commission did make some positive points. Maeve Sherlock, the former head of the Refugee Council, stressed the “responsibility” that Britain had to the people of Iraq.

Unfortunately, once it has gone through the British establishment translator, “responsibility” can end up meaning any number of things, with most of them somehow entailing us continuing to occupy a foreign country with which we had no quarrel.

The commission stressed that we had to be looking to the future. But one cannot help feeling that this was just a way of avoiding any understanding of the illegal, brutal realities of the recent past.

The first step to beating addiction is to admit you are an addict. The British state seems addicted to unleashing violence, with the inevitable and all too predictable deadly consequences for the powerless. Yet no public discussion or debate on Iraq or Afghanistan will face up to that fact.

Without a real understanding of why the Bush administration wanted to invade Iraq (I’ll give you a clue Paddy, it’s something to do with those giant bases you forgot to mention) and why the British Government decided to join it, in the face of massive public opposition, such a commission will simply perpetuate the most dangerous illusions.

Category: Iraq | Tags: